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Abstract 
This  paper  addresses  the  democratically  fundamental  question  of  the  inclusiveness  of 
electorates and of its impact on citizens’ representation. While the literature has focussed on 
the congruence between  voters and representatives, it has neglected congruence issues 
between citizens and representatives. The paper investigates comparatively this bias and 
source of newly disenfranchised citizens in a globalised society with increasing mobility. On 
the one hand, electoral laws vary in their inclusion or exclusion of expatriates (emigrants) 
and  in  the  right  to  vote  to  non-national  residents  (immigrants).  On  the  other  hand, 
naturalisation laws vary in the maintenance of nationality for expatriates and in their inclusion 
of  non-national  residents.  We  illustrate  levels  of  ―discrepancy‖  between  electorate  and 
citizenship  in  22  OECD  countries  qualitatively,  by  presenting  differences  of  electoral  and 
nationality  laws,  and  quantitatively,  by  comparing  the  size  of  citizenship  with  that  of  the 
electorate, and the national and resident populations. We show that shifts between political 
and national communities are primarily due to naturalisation laws and that electoral laws 
have so far been unable to correct for the discrepancy. 
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I.   Introduction 
Early studies of forming democratic citizenship have focussed on the progressive inclusion of 
increasingly large segments of the population in the electorate, what classical sociologists 
and political scientists called ―incorporation‖ or ―participation‖.
1 With the full enfranchisement 
of  the  adult  population  and  with  the  consolidation  of  national  membership  boundaries  of 
political  systems  the  analytical  focus  shifted  toward  Rokkan’s  third  threshold  of 
democratisation, that is, ―representation‖. Since then, citizen–representative congruence has 
been at the heart of the empirical study of the quality of democratic representation, that is
 the 
degree  to  which  voters’  preferences  are  reflected  among  representatives.
2  While  early 
studies  focused  on  measures  of  proportionality,  in  the  last  years  empirical  research  has 
addressed the correspondence between ideological preferences at the electorate level and 
at the policy-makers level. In this regard, the literature has greatly improved the way in which 
the congruence between citizens and representatives is measured.
3 
Yet, the analysis of congruence in representation has been conducted under the assumption 
that electorates by and large reflect citizens. This assumption coul d be safely made under 
circumstances  of  consolidated  national  boundaries  of  political  systems.  The  equation 
between citizenship and electorate is however increasingly problematic in a globalising 
society with increasing geographical mobility. The definitio n of citizenship merely through 
political rights (the right to vote) is restrictive and does not take into account other elements 
of  citizenship  such  as  social  rights  (Marshall,  1963)  and  nationality  (Brubaker,  1992). 
According to a more encompassing view,   the electorate is only a subgroup within the 
citizenry. The assumption of correspondence between citizens and voters  – which probably 
has  never  been  entirely  realistic  –  does  certainly  not  apply  to  periods  of  elevated 
international mobility with life-long immigrants and emigrants transcending generations. The 
definition  of  citizenship  and  electorate  under  processes  of  supra-national  integration  and 
globalisation is today subject to ―restructuring‖ of boundaries very similar to that of other 
aspects of social and political life.
4 
Under these conditions, the phrase ―no taxation without representation‖ acquires new scope. 
An increasing share of citizens living and working outside their countries lose political rights 
leading to a shift between citizenship and electorate. The claim this paper makes is that the 
measurement  of  citizen–representative  congruence  cannot  be  equated  with  voter–
representative  congruence  and  that  therefore  issues  of  inclusion  should  be  revisited.  By 
                                                       
1 Rokkan speaks of incorporation in his model of democratisation based on four thresholds (Rokkan, 1999). Dahl 
presents  a  similar  model  of  the  first  wave  of  democratisation  along  the  two  dimensions  of  liberalisation  and 
participation (Dahl, 1970). On these processes see also Bendix (1977). 
2 Accountability has been understood as the other main dimension of democratic representation (see, for example, 
Mansbridge, 2003; see also Powell, 2000).  
3 See Huber and Powell (1994), Powell (2000), Powell and Vanberg (2000), Blais and Bodet (2006), Golder and 
Stramski (2010). 
4 For the most systematic treatment of the restructuring of the boundaries of political systems under pressure of 
supra-national integration see Bartolini (2005). 2 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
focussing  on  the  quality  of  representation  of  electorates  through  representatives,  the 
literature has forgotten issues of inclusiveness. It is this gap that the paper aims to fill. By 
claiming that this discrepancy has a deep impact on the quality of representation, we believe 
our argument has important implications for future studies on representation. It proposes that 
representation studies should clarify their understanding of citizenship and operationalise it 
accordingly, calling for measures of representation against different definitions of citizenship. 
It thus proposes to focus on the under-representation of entire social groups rather than on 
the  distribution  of  voters’  preferences.  In  other  words,  we  wish  to  shift  the  focus  from 
representation to inclusion. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we elaborate on the notion of citizenship in relation 
to the electorate and representation. Second, we present a typology of electorates and the 
potential causes of variations among types. We show that ideal-typically the right to vote can 
be granted to (1) nationals (including expatriates), (2) residents (including non-nationals), or 
a combination of both, i.e. (3) resident nationals only or (4) all residents and nationals. Third, 
we  show  qualitatively  variance  in  voting  rights  for  non-national  residents  and  national 
expatriates across 22 countries and, quantitatively, the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorates  in  these  countries.  The  conclusion  discusses  normatively  the  relationship 
between  national  and  political  community,  and  makes  a  proposal  to  overcome  the  shift 
between citizenship and political rights. I H S — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — 3 
II.   Citizenship, Electorates and Representation 
The issue of inclusion deals with the relationship between citizenship and electorate. While 
political rights (the electorate) constitute a crucial dimension of citizenship, the latter concept 
is broader. We define citizenship as the (potential) access to social rights that are granted to 
a  group  of  people  either  through  nationality  (which  applies  to  resident  nationals  and 
expatriates), or through residency (which applies to national and non-national residents) and, 
consequently,  taxation  duties.  In  the  first  case  we  speak  of  a  membership  principle  (the 
group  of  nationals);  in  the  second  case  we  speak  of  a  territorial  principle  (the  group  of 
residents). In both cases citizenship is attached to a number of rights (but also duties) which 
an individual can make use of or claim. This entails a definition of citizenship which does not 
necessarily correspond to that of the electorate. On the contrary, it is likely that it goes well 
beyond that of the electorate. For example, immigrants have access to social provisions and 
pay taxes, but do not enjoy political rights. Furthermore, expatriates may profit from welfare 
provisions (or can always claim them by returning to the country) without enjoying political 
rights. 
In  Marshall’s  (1963)  classical  formulation  citizenship  includes  civic,  political  and  social 
rights.
5 Nationality has been the most important institution for the provision of citizenshi p 
rights.
6 The reception of citizenship rights is, however, only partly dependent on nationality. 
In particular, civic rights are not bounded to nationality as they have developed towards 
human rights, which are increasingly granted on a global scale. Abov e all, social rights only 
partly depend on nationality as non-national residents in most Western countries get similar 
social provisions as national residents. The status of non -national residents, which have 
social but not political rights, has been descr ibed as ―denizenship‖ (Hammar, 1990). The 
concept of citizenship is therefore more encompassing than any operationalisation based on 
political rights. Political rights that define the electorate include, depending on the countries, 
a  more  or  less  wide  proportion  of  citizens  –  as  broadly  defined  above  as  the  potential 
recipients  of  social  rights  either  based  on  nationality  or  residency.  There  is  therefore  a 
varying  discrepancy  (across  countries)  between  electorate  and  citizenship  with  some 
countries achieving a more or less complete coverage of the citizenship and some countries 
excluding a more or less large group. 
 
                                                       
5 The nation-state has been, and largely continues to be, the locus of political and social rights. This applies to a 
lesser extent to civic rights, which have an application across national borders independent of nationality. This is 
the reason why – as reiterated further down – we focus on the national level as opposed to the local or supra-
national ones. 
6 It has been granted on two principles: ethnicity and residency  (Brubaker, 1992). Which principle is dominant 
depends on conceptions of nationhood  (see also Koopmans et al., 2005). While civic conceptions of nationhood 
foster legal citizenship laws that give nationality dependent on residence (jus soli), nationality is according to an 
ethnic conception of nationhood provided dependent on descent (jus sanguinis) (see also Weil, 1984). 4 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
The  distinction  between  citizenship  and  voting  rights  had  little  impact  on  voters–
representatives congruence during the peak of the nationalised state. This is because of the 
strong  coincidence  of  the  territorial  boundaries  (residency)  and  membership  boundaries 
(nationality) during the peak of nationalisation. The closure of political, cultural, social, and to 
some degree economic boundaries along the unitary state (Rokkan, 1999; Caramani, 2004) 
and  the  following  cultural  homogenisation  (Gellner,  1983)  has  created  a  far-reaching 
congruence of rights and duties along the lines of the ―nation-state‖. Only recent trends of 
globalisation and European integration have resulted in a decoupling of boundaries along 
different  functional  and  territorial  dimensions.  The  decoupling  of  territorial  from  national 
boundaries has important consequences. The increase of migration within and between the 
developed  and  developing  world  has  had  the  effect  on  a  growing  non-national  resident 
population and on the size of the expatriate community, as well as on the size of the national 
community through increasing naturalisation rates. 
The decoupling also affects the composition of electorates. This is because electoral rights 
are usually connected to nationality, residency or both. Having the right to vote does not 
entirely depend on being a national, as in some countries it (also) depends on residence: 
whether or not expatriates should have the right to vote, and whether or not non-national 
residents  (immigrants)  should  be  allowed  to  vote.  In  the  age  of  globalisation  and 
technological  progress  the  potential  impact  of  the  expatriates’  votes  has  become 
considerable with elections being potentially decided ―from abroad‖. Globalisation increases 
mobility, which affects the size of the expatriate community and strengthens the transnational 
bonds. Technological innovation has, among others, the effect that voting from abroad has 
become much easier. With electronic voting, space ceases being a decisive factor for the 
possibility to vote. As will be shown in the next section, electoral rights for expatriates vary 
considerably across countries and have a strong (potential) impact on the size and shape of 
the electorate. 
Electoral laws also vary concerning the resident population. Increasingly, countries differ in 
whether they grant voting rights to non-national residents. Although a trend towards electoral 
rights  for  non-national  residents  can  so  far  mainly  be  observed  at  the  local  level,  a  few 
countries  granted  the  right  to  vote  in  national  elections  to  all  residents.
7  The effect the 
expansion of the electoral right to non-nationals has on the shape and size of the electorate 
depends on the size of the foreign community in a given country. The impact of the electoral 
rights to non-national residents on the variance in the electorates across countries depends 
on the migration flows and on naturalisation laws. All this increases the discrepancy between 
electorate and citizenship, as well as the extent to which this discrepancy varies across 
countries. According to our definition of citizenship it leads to  newly disenfranchised groups, 
namely expatriates and immigrants. Examples of citizens  who lost the right to vote back 
                                                       
7 We limit our discussion to the right to vote at the national level and exclude provisions for political rights for non-
national residents at the local or regional level. We also exclude political rights in foreign countries due to supra-
national democratic bodies such as the European Parliament. I H S — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — 5 
―home‖ but did not acquire it in the receiving country are numerous (for example, Turks in 
Germany),  with  some  cases  of  explicit  discouragement  from  both  the  sending  and  the 
receiving country.
8 
We do not make the claim that inclusiveness  necessarily affects the voter–representative 
relationship.  The  quality  of  representation  is  in  principle  independent  from  levels  of 
inclusiveness.
9 However, if the preferences of the emigrants and immigrants syst ematically 
differ from the national resident ones, whether these groups keep or receive the right to vote 
(through  naturalisation  or  the  electoral  law)  matters  for  the  citizen –representative 
congruence. The claim this paper makes is that the analysis of the quality of representation 
can  no  longer  afford  to  use  the  shortcut  of  equating  citizenship  with  the  electorate  as 
increasingly  large  and  permanent  segments  of  the  citizenship  are  excluded  (rather  than 
included)  from  access  to  political  rights.  It  is  this  discrepancy  between  citizenship  and 
electorate – a problem of inclusion rather than representation – that this paper is concerned 
with. 
                                                       
8 We deliberately renounce to discuss the exclusion of other social groups such as minors, prisoners and mentally ill 
persons for which provisions also widely vary across countries. 
9 In theory, one can achieve perfect representation also when no citizen has the right vote. 6 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
III.   A Typology of Electorates 
III.1.   Four Types of Electorates 
In developed democracies the shape of the electorate can ideal-typically be summarised in 
four different types depending on whether or not the electoral right is given to non-national 
residents and/or expatriates. Similar to Bauböck (2005:  685),  who  distinguishes between 
four perspectives on ―expansive electoral rights‖, we distinguish four types of electorates: 
  The  national-resident  electorate  includes  nationals  living  in  their  home  country.  It 
excludes  non-national  immigrants  and  nationals  who  expatriated.  It  is  the  most 
restrictive  type  of  electorate  as,  according  to  this  ideal-type,  only  nationals  living 
within the borders of ―their‖ state are entitled to vote. The closest empirical case of 
this type is Canada.
10 
  The  national  electorate  includes  all  nationals  independently  of  whether  they  are 
resident in their ―homeland‖ or not. Voting rights are granted to nationals in the home 
countries and to nationals who emigrated abroad (expatriates). The principle here is 
purely based on membership. The closest empirical case of this type is Italy.
11 
  The resident electorate includes all individuals who are resident in a given country 
independently of their nationality. Whether or not they are nationals, people living in 
a country have the right to vote. The principle here is purely territorial. This includes 
resident nationals and non-national immigrants. The closest empirical case of this 
type is New Zealand.
12 
  The national and resident electorate includes all nationals (whether or not they live in 
the home country) as well as all residents (nationals and foreigners). These are the 
most inclusive electoral rules extending political rights not only to expatriates but 
also to non-national residents. Both membership and territory principles apply. The 
closest example of this type is Britain but, strictly speaking, there are no empirical 
cases.
13 
                                                       
10 For all these examples qualifications are in order. In Canada, for example, expatriates have the right to vote from 
abroad during the first five years after emigration. 
11  Italy only recently introduced provisions for voting from abroad linked to registration in a consulate. Before, 
expatriates had to travel back to Italy to make use of their right to vote. 
12 This is due to the very short period of time during which expatriates keep the right to vote from abroad (three 
years). The minimum requirement for qualifying to vote for residents is one year for non-nationals. 
13 British nationals living abroad can vote as long as the first 15 years after expatriation. Furthermore, the category 
of ―residents‖ is very expansive as it includes all resident Commonwealth nationals (as well as Irish nationals). I H S — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — 7 
These types of electorates are listed from the most restrictive to the most extensive. The two 
principles that apply are the membership and the territorial one. Their combination can be 
depicted  as in Figure 1. Two types are pure in the  sense that they  are based on either 
territorial or membership principles, whereas two are mixed in the sense that they combine 
both principles. Below we will show the degree to which developed democracies fit into these 
ideal-types and, consequently, the degree to which they differ. We do not rely only on the 
qualitative description of the rules, but also present quantitative data on the actual shape and 
size  of  the  electorates.  For  the  moment  being,  we  concentrate  on  types  and  sources  of 
variation between countries. 
 
Figure 1: Four types of electorates in modern democracies 
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III.2.   Sources of Cross-Country Variation 
Electorates across countries vary because of differing provisions in two types of laws: first, 
the nationality law and, second, the electoral law. In addition, electorates vary because of 
differences in immigration and emigration rates. 
1. Nationality laws are relevant for variations in electorates, and in the degree of discrepancy 
between  citizenship  and  electorate,  as  nationality  automatically  gives  access  to  political 
rights.  Nationality  laws  affect  membership.  First,  nationality  laws  determine  the  size  of 
expatriate  electorate  (emigration)  in  that  it  rules  on  the  maintenance  of  nationality  after 
leaving  the  country  (especially  for  further  generations).  Second,  nationality  (here,  strictly 
speaking,  naturalisation  laws)  determines  the  size  of  non-national  resident  communities 8 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
(immigrants) in that it rules on the access to nationality for resident immigrants (again also 
for  further  generations).  Nationality  laws  affect  the  extent  to  which  more  or  less  large 
immigrant/emigrant groups get (or keep) nationality and consequently political rights. 
2. Electoral laws are relevant for variation in electorates, and in the degree of discrepancy 
between  citizenship  and  electorate,  as  they  grant  the  right  to  vote.  Electoral  laws  affect 
territoriality. First, electoral laws rule on the right to vote within the country for non-nationals. 
It is through the electoral law that political rights are given to residents who are not nationals 
(immigrants).  Second,  electoral  laws  rule  on  the  right  to  vote  outside  the  country  for 
nationals. It is through the electoral law that political rights are given to nationals who are not 
resident  (emigrants).  Electoral  laws  affect  the  extent  to  which  more  or  less  large 
immigrant/emigrant groups get (or keep) political rights (independently of nationality). 
3. The interaction between migration rates and the two types of law is crucial, as the data in 
the quantitative part of the paper (next section) show. Figure 2 summarises the discussion. 
What appears to be crucial is the interaction between rates of immigration/emigration (and 
therefore the size of non-national resident groups and expatriates) on the one hand, and the 
legal framework which makes it possible to access the right to vote. As mentioned, there are 
two possibilities for getting the right to vote: nationality and electoral law. 
The  groups  of  non-national  residents  and  expatriates  can  be  either  small  or  large  (we 
simplify for the sake of the argument). We ignore the possibility in which they are small as 
this does not affect the level of discrepancy between citizenship and electorate. If there are 
only very little numbers of immigrants and emigrants, citizenship and electorate correspond. 
They  also  correspond  if  immigrants  are  given  the  nationality  since  citizens  acquire 
automatically the right to vote. Also when emigrants lose the nationality (and therefore claims 
to social rights) the two correspond.
14 The interesting cases in the perspective of this paper 
are those in which one finds large numbers of either immigrants or emigrants or both. In this 
case we do not have a citizenship corresponding to the electorate as many nationals may 
not have the right to vote (because they live abroad) and many non-nationals living in the 
country  may  not  have  the  right  to  vote.  If  there  are  large  numbers  of  emigrants  and/or 
immigrants, citizenship and electorate do not correspond unless the legal framework corrects 
for it (either through the nationality law or the electoral law).
15 The last column of the table 
shows how the combination of legal provisions for the right to  vote of emigrants and 
immigrants combine to determine the four types of electorates. 
                                                       
14 Note that losing the nationality does not only depend on the country of origin but also on the host country which 
may require emigrants to give up their nationality of origin. 
15 The figure simplifies a much more complicated story in which access to political rights for nationals living abroad 
is made difficult by registration requirements. This is discussed and illustrated below in the quantitative part of the 
analysis. I H S — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — 9 
Figure 2: Access to political rights for non-national residents (immigrants) and national expatriates (emigrants) 
 
Groups 
 
Rates 
 
Political rights through legal framework 
 
Types of electorate 
    Nationality law    Electoral law   
                     
        Nationality        Vote  (*)   
                     
    Large                 
            Political rights    Vote  (1)   
        No nationality             
Immigration 
(non-national 
residents) 
          No political rights    No vote  (2)   
                   
                   
  Small    …        …  (*)   
                   
            Political rights    Vote  (3)   
        Nationality             
            No political rights    No vote  (4)   
    Large                 
                     
        No nationality        No vote  (*)   
Emigration 
(national 
expatriates) 
                   
                   
                   
  Small    …        …  (*)   
                     
Legend:  Combination  1–4:  Resident  electorate  (New  Zealand);  Combination  1–3:  National  and  resident  electorate  (Britain);  Combination  2–3:  National  electorate  (Italy,  Portugal); 
Combination 2–4: National-resident electorate (Canada); (*) Cases in which citizenship and electorate correspond. 
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IV.   Discrepant Electorates in 22 OECD Countries 
We divide the empirical analysis in two parts. First, qualitatively, we carry out the analysis of 
nationality laws and electoral laws, and how they empirically vary across countries. Second, 
quantitatively, we propose an analysis of the discrepancy between citizenship and electorate 
based on the size of expatriate and non-national resident groups. 
IV.1.   Qualitative Analysis: Naturalisation Laws and Electoral Laws 
As we have seen above, it is possible to acquire voting rights either through nationality laws 
or through electoral laws. The first includes individuals in the membership of nationals, or 
excludes them. The second includes individuals resident in a territory (non-national citizens) 
and  those  resident  abroad,  or  excludes  them.  What  appears  from  the  comparative 
information  collected  for  22  OECD  countries  presented  in  Table  1  is  that  countries  vary 
above all in regard to nationality laws and hardly vary in regard to electoral laws. 
On the one hand, in only very few countries do electoral laws allow non-national residents 
(immigrants) to vote in national or federal elections. The only such case is New Zealand. 
There are other two cases in which specific types of ―non-nationals‖ are allowed to vote: first, 
Brazilians  in  Portugal  under  a  number  of  special  conditions;  second,  British  nationals  in 
Ireland; third, Commonwealth and Irish nationals in the United Kingdom. In no other country 
in  the  sample  considered  here  can  resident  foreigners  participate  in  national  or  federal 
elections. On the other hand, almost all countries allow their national expatriates (emigrants) 
to maintain the right to vote. As we see from Table 1 most countries allow their nationals 
abroad to keep the right to vote either indeterminately or for a more or less long period of 
time. In this regard, the variation is quite large. Out of the 22 countries, 15 allow expatriates 
to maintain the right to vote without time limits. There is one country that does not allow its 
nationals to vote if living abroad: Ireland.
16 Considering the size of Irish emigration to the 
United States, granting emigrants the right to vote would mean that the election could be 
decided overseas. Among the remaining six countries, there are three that allow to keep the 
right to vote for a short period of time (New Zealand for three years, Canada for five and 
Australia for six). Portugal allows emigrants to vote in national elections for up to ten years 
after expatriation. The impact of this variation on the discrepancy between c itizenship and 
electorate obviously depends on the size of both immigration and emigration. We will deal 
with the interaction between laws and rates of migrations in the quantitative analysis. 
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Table 1: Electoral rights at the national level for non-national residents (immigrants) 
and national expatriates (emigrants) in 22 OECD countries 
 
Country 
Electoral rights for 
national expatriates 
(emigrants)
1 
Electoral 
rights for 
non-national 
residents 
(immigrants) 
Access to 
nationality 
(MIPEX 
Index, 
0–100) 
Share of 
foreign-
born 
residents 
(2000/01) 
         
Australia  For the first six years  No  N.a.  23.1 
Austria  Yes  No  22  10.5 
Belgium  Yes  No  71  10.3 
Canada  For the first five 
years 
No  67  18.1 
Czech Republic  Yes  No  50  4.2 
Denmark  Yes  No  33  5.8 
Finland  Yes  No  44  2.6 
Germany  For the first 25 years  No  38  12.5 
Iceland  Yes  No  N.a.  N.a. 
Ireland  No
2  Partly
4  62  8.7 
Italy  Yes  No  33  2.5 
Japan  Yes  No  N.a.  N.a. 
Luxembourg  Yes  No  45  33.2 
Netherlands  Yes  No  51  10.1 
New Zealand  For the first three 
years 
Yes  N.a.  17.2 
Norway  Yes  No  39  6.8 
Portugal  For the first ten 
years
3 
Partly
4  69  5.1 
Spain  Yes  No  41  5.3 
Sweden  Yes  No  71  11.5 
Switzerland  Yes  No  44  21.9 
United Kingdom  For the first 15 years  Partly
4  62  7.9 
United States  Yes  No  N.a.  11.0 
         
 
Notes: 
 
1)  In most countries, expatriates usually need to register as voters (Green, 2007). 
2)  Only diplomats and military. 
3)  Not more than 15 years in the EU or a Portuguese speaking country. Additionally, they have to 
stay at least 30 days in Portugal in the last five years, and speak Portuguese (Costa Lobo, 
2007: 84). 
4)  In the case of Ireland British residents are also allowed to vote for Dáil elections. In Portugal, 
Brazilian citizens with special rights acquire voting rights, and in the United Kingdom, these 
rights include Commonwealth and Irish citizens. 
N.a.  Information not available. 
 
Sources:  Data  on  expatriate  voting  rights  from  IDEA  (2007);  electoral  rights  for  immigrants  and 
access to nationality from Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007); data on foreign born 
population from OECD (2006). 
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Contrary to electoral laws, nationality laws vary a great deal across countries in the extent to 
which they give access to nationality and, consequently, voting rights. Nationality laws are 
the set of rules through which the conditions for the gain or loss of nationality are set. For 
clarity we will speak in general of ―nationality law‖ to indicate the extent to which emigrants 
maintain their nationality of origin, and of ―naturalisation law‖ to indicate the extent to which 
immigrants  acquire  the  new  nationality.  Most  countries  do  not  deprive  emigrants  of  their 
nationality  even  after  generations  –  some  do  for  the  third  generation.  Nationality  laws 
therefore do not vary a great deal in regard to national expatriates (emigrants).
17 They do 
vary, however, a great deal in regard to the naturalisation of non -national resident citizens. 
While naturalisation laws based on jus sanguinis are very closed towards ethnically distinct 
immigrants – and therefore generate large numbers of non-national residents – countries 
based on jus soli tend to be much more open in the way they naturalise the majority of their 
immigrant  residents.  Good  examples  of  ―hard-to-get‖  naturalisation  are  Austria  and 
Switzerland.  The  third  column  in  Table  1,  however,  points  to  other  countries  for  which 
naturalisation  for  non-national  residents  is  difficult.  Using  the  MIPEX  index  that 
operationalise  the  easiness  with  which  single  nationalities  can  be  acquired,  we  see  that 
besides Austria and Switzerland, also Germany, Denmark and Finland (as well as Italy and 
Spain)  have  naturalisation  laws  unfavourable  to  the  incorporation  of  non-nationals  in  the 
electorate through the nationality law. 
The discussion so far leads us to conclude that electoral laws vary little with the exception of 
Ireland (as far as the electoral law on emigrants is concerned) and New Zealand (as far as 
the  electoral  law  concerning  immigrants  is  concerned).  In  regard  to  the  acquisition  of 
nationality and therefore the automatic access to political rights, again we find little variation 
concerning nationality law (emigrants). However, there is a large variation in naturalisation 
laws (immigrants). This information leads us to formulate the hypothesis that differences in 
the  levels  of  discrepancy  (between  citizenship  and  electorates)  are  primarily  caused  by 
variations in naturalisation laws, and amplified by a large influx of immigrants. 
IV.2.   Quantitative Analysis: Size of Emigration and Immigration 
In this section we proceed in three steps. First, we describe citizenship in 21 countries.
18 
Then, we describe electorates. Finally, we describe the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorate and interpret variations in the levels of discrepancy with reference to (1) nationality 
and electoral laws (mentioned above) and (2) rates of immigration and emigration. 
                                                       
17 Regulations regarding the maintenance of nationality for expatriates is made more complicated by conditions set 
by the receiving country and the possibility to have a double nationality. A good example is the impact on the 
German naturalisation law on the propensity of Turkish immigrants to resign from their former nationality before 
the change of the German naturalization law in 2002. 
18 We must unfortunately exclude New Zealand from this part of the analysis because of unreliable information. I H S — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — 13 
The data on which we can draw are official register data from national statistical offices and 
from  the  OECD.  Census  data  contain  the  number  of  residents  and  the  number  of  non-
national residents by age cohorts. The size of the electorates has been derived from data on 
electoral results. The data on expatriate communities had, in several cases, to be estimated. 
The most valid (and in many cases only) estimates on the size of the expatriate community 
have been calculated by the OECD for the year 2000 (2001 for Italy). They only include the 
number of expatriates in other OECD countries and should therefore be interpreted as the 
lower bound of the real number. The data further estimate the number of expatriates at the 
age of 15 or older and do therefore slightly overestimate the share of expatriates at voting 
age. 
Table 2: Citizenship in 21 OECD countries 
 
Country  Adult 
citizenship 
Non-national 
residents 
(immigrants) 
National 
expatriates 
(emigrants) 
Resident 
nationals  Total 
  (absolute)              (as % of citizens) 
           
Japan  104,353,921  1.1  0.6  98.4  100.0 
Czech Republic  8,413,143  1.8  2.7  95.6  100.0 
Canada  25,326,533  0.8  4.1  95.1  100.0 
Spain  34,355,265  3.8  2.5  93.7  100.0 
Australia  14,882,361  4.9  1.8  93.3  100.0 
Norway  3,564,658  4.1  3.4  92.4  100.0 
Finland  4,335,367  1.8  6.1  92.1  100.0 
United States  210,088,689  7.6  0.4  92.0  100.0 
Sweden  7,151,617  5.4  2.9  91.7  100.0 
Denmark  4,361,200  4.4  4.0  91.6  100.0 
Netherlands  13,071,282  3.9  4.7  91.3  100.0 
Italy  50,810,452  2.0  7.2  90.8  100.0 
United 
Kingdom  48,720,576  5.6  6.6  87.8  100.0 
Belgium  8,477,923  8.6  3.8  87.6  100.0 
Germany  69,992,647  8.3  4.2  87.6  100.0 
Iceland  223,839  3.3  10.3  86.4  100.0 
Portugal  9,531,004  2.6  13.3  84.1  100.0 
Switzerland  5,969,867  18.2  4.4  77.4  100.0 
Austria  7,548,342  18.0  4.8  77.2  100.0 
Ireland  3,516,392  6.0  22.5  71.4  100.0 
Luxembourg  363,846  33.3  7.5  59.3  100.0 
           
 
Notes:  Countries are ordered by size of resident nationals. Citizenship is defined as the sum of all 
nationals (in country and abroad) and all residents in the country (whether nationals or 
not). All  figures  exclude  youngsters  below  18  years  of  age. The  interpretation  of  such 
figures must allow for bias caused by prisoners and mentally ill persons who, in some 
countries, are excluded from voting rights. New Zealand is excluded because of unreliable 
information. 
Sources:  National statistical offices; Dumont and Lemaître (2005). Because in the case of the Czech 
Republic and Spain the estimates have been unrealistically low, the share of expatriates is 
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Table  2  presents  some  basic  information  about  citizenship,  defined  as  access  to  social 
rights, for our sample of 21 countries. Let us remind that we consider citizens all those who 
possess the nationality of the country (whether they live in the country or not) plus those who 
live in the country (whether they are nationals or not). It is interesting to see that there is a 
great deal of variation in the composition of citizenship in these countries. There are six 
countries which have a proportion of non-national residents (immigrants) between 5% and 
10% (United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, United States, Ireland and Sweden). There are 
two  countries  with  much  higher  proportions:  Austria  and  Switzerland  (about  18%).  And, 
finally,  Luxembourg  with  33%  of  non-national  resident  citizens  (mostly  due  to  European 
institutions  and financial centres). For the remaining 12 countries, the proportion  of non-
national residents is below 5%. Some variation exists also in the proportion of citizens who 
live abroad, that is national expatriates (emigrants). The large exception here is Ireland with 
22.5%  of  its  citizens  living  overseas.  Iceland  and  Portugal  have  a  share  of  expatriates 
around 10–13%. Three countries have rates of nationals living abroad of 5–8% (Finland, 
Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  United  Kingdom).  The  remaining  14  countries  have  rates  of 
expatriates of less than 5%. 
Table 3: Electorates in 21 OECD countries 
 
Country  Citizenship  Electorate  Difference 
Difference 
(as % of 
total 
citizenship) 
         
Luxembourg  363,846  221,103  142,743  39.2 
Switzerland  5,969,867  4,628,782  1,341,085  22.5 
Austria  7,548,342  5,912,592  1,635,750  21.7 
Canada  25,326,533  21,243,473  4,083,060  16.1 
Ireland  3,516,392  3,002,173  514,219  14.6 
Australia  14,882,361  12,708,837  2,173,524  14.6 
Germany  69,992,647  61,432,868  8,559,779  12.2 
Belgium  8,477,923  7,570,637  907,286  10.7 
United Kingdom  48,720,576  44,403,238  4,317,338  8.9 
Denmark  4,361,200  3,998,957  362,243  8.3 
Netherlands  13,071,282  12,035,935  1,035,347  7.9 
United States  210,088,689  194,327,000  15,761,689  7.5 
Portugal  9,531,004  8,902,713  628,291  6.6 
Sweden  7,151,617  6,722,163  429,454  6.0 
Norway  3,564,658  3,358,856  205,802  5.8 
Iceland  223,839  211,289  12,550  5.6 
Japan  104,353,921  100,433,798  3,920,123  3.8 
Spain  34,355,265  33,045,318  1,309,947  3.8 
Italy  50,810,452  49,358,947  1,451,505  2.9 
Finland  4,335,367  4,220,951  114,416  2.6 
Czech Republic  8,413,143  8,264,484  148,659  1.8 
         
 
Notes:  Countries are ordered by level of discrepancy as a percentage of citizenship. New Zealand is 
excluded because of missing information. 
Sources: National statistical offices; Dumont and Lemaître (2005). I H S — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — 15 
In Table 3 countries are ranked according to the degree of discrepancy between citizenship 
and electorates (last column). The simple indicator we use here is the percentage of citizens 
without voting rights, that is, those not included in the electorate. It is a measure of ―political 
exclusion‖: the larger the percentage, the more exclusive the franchise. On top of the table, 
Luxembourg  stands  out  with  nearly  40%  of  citizens  –  i.e.  mostly  non-national  residents 
(immigrants) – excluded from voting rights. Table 4 below informs us about the composition 
of this excluded segments of the citizenship. Around 85% of the disenfranchised citizens in 
Luxembourg are immigrants and only 15% are nationals who expatriated. Two very similar 
cases are Austria and Switzerland. For the two Alpine cases, too, there is a large proportion 
of citizens who does not have the right to vote in federal elections (about 22% in both cases). 
This  is  one  out  of  five  citizens. As  for  Luxembourg,  disenfranchised  citizens  are  mostly 
(above  80%  for  both Austria  and  Switzerland)  non-national  residents.
19 Additional similar 
cases are Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy. For these countries we 
see  a  lower  level  of  discrepancy ,  that  is,  exclusion.  However,  the  composition  of  the 
excluded citizens is very similar to that of Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria, with more 
than 65% of the excluded citizens being immigrants.
20 
Things look differently for Portugal and Ireland, as well as for Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Japan. Portugal does not have a very high rate of discrepancy (6.6%). It is only slightly 
higher for Denmark and the Netherlands (about 8%) while for Japan it is 3.8%. On the 
contrary, the rate is quite high for Ireland (14.6%). What these five cases have in common is 
that the proportion of citizens without voting rights are to a large extent national expatriates 
who lost the right to vote. The proportion of expatriates among the disenfranchised citizens is 
around  75%  fo r  Ireland,  60%  for  Portugal,  and  around  50%  for  Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands. Another country for which the proportion is high is Japan: above 70% of the 
discrepancy (which, however, is a small one) is due to national expatriates. This is explained 
by the very low immigration rates in Japan.
21 
   
                                                       
19  The  same  is  true  for  Spain  and  the  Czech  Republic.  Because  in  these  cases  the  OECD  estimates  of  the 
expatriate community have been unrealistically low, it has been estimated as the deviation of the electorate from 
the national residents. In reality, however, the share of expatriates without the right to vote is still somewhat higher 
implying that slightly less than 100% of the disenfranchised are immigrants. 
20 Incomplete data sources do not allow us to comment on Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
21 Other countries with a quite large segment of expatriates among the excluded citizens are Iceland, Italy, Finland 
and the United Kingdom. The proportion of emigrants in the segment of citizenship without voting rights is above 
30% for all these countries. 16 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
Table 4: Composition of discrepant electorates in 18 OECD countries 
 
Country 
Difference 
citizenship–
electorate 
Difference 
(as % of 
citizenship) 
Non-national 
residents 
(immigrants) 
Non-national 
residents 
(as % of 
difference) 
National 
expatriates 
(emigrants) 
Expatriates 
without vote 
Expatriates 
without vote 
(as % of 
difference) 
               
Luxembourg  142,743  39.2  121,058  84.8  27,164  21,685  15.2 
Switzerland  1,341,085  22.5  1,084,645  80.9  262,456  256,440  19.1 
Austria  1,635,750  21.7  1,357,388  83.0  366,024  278,362  17.0 
Ireland  514,219  14.6  211,742  41.2  792,316  385,000  74.9 
Germany  8,559,779  12.2  5,774,762  67.5  2,933,757  2,785,017  32.5 
Belgium  907,286  10.7  727,161  80.1  321,544  180,125  19.9 
Denmark  362,243  8.3  191,261  52.8  173,009  170,982  47.2 
Netherlands  1,035,347  7.9  515,156  49.8  616,909  520,191  50.2 
Portugal  628,291  6.6  244,526  38.9  1,268,726  383,765  61.1 
Sweden  429,454  6.0  386,977  90.1  206,604  42,477  9.9 
Norway  205,802  5.8  147,125  71.5  122,079  58,677  28.5 
Iceland  12,550  5.6  7,450  59.4  23,070  5,100  40.6 
United Kingdom  4,317,338  8.9  2,710,900  62.8  3,229,676  1,606,438  37.2 
Japan  3,920,123  3.8  1,121,446  28.6  575,992  2,798,677  71.4 
Spain  1,309,947  3.8  1,309,947  100.0  849,298  0  0.0 
Italy  1,451,505  2.9  1,003,451  69.1  3,649,377  448,054  30.9 
Finland  114,416  2.6  76,425  66.8  265,245  37,991  33.2 
Czech Republic  148,659  1.8  148,659  100.0  241,529  0  0,0 
               
 
Note:  This table does not include the United States, Australia and Canada for  which data on the composition of the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorate is strongly influenced by registration rules which make the interpretation of data difficult. Data on the number of registered voters are not 
available. Furthermore, for the US special regulations in regard to prisoners further bias the figures. New Zealand is excluded because of unreliable data. 
For Spanish and Czech figures, see footnote 19. 
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These figures are summarised graphically in Figure 3. The level ―zero‖ indicates the number 
of  voters  as  of  official  electoral  registers.  The  four  bars  indicate  deviations  from  the 
electorate. The white bars correspond to our definition of citizenship: all nationals (wherever 
they  live)  plus  all  those  living  in  the  country  and  paying  taxes  there  (whatever  their 
nationality).  In  some  countries,  such  as  Luxembourg,  Switzerland  and Austria,  there  are 
many more citizens than voters. The striped bars show that in most cases there are more 
nationals than voters and, therefore, that there always are nationals without the right to vote 
(those  living  abroad). The  dotted  bars  indicate  that  the  number  of  nationals  living  in  the 
country is usually only a part of the electorate, although a very large one obviously. Negative 
bars indicate here that the group of national residents is smaller than the electorate. This 
means that in these countries expatriates have the right to vote, with the exception of Ireland 
where the discrepancy between the share of national residents and the electorate is due to 
the voting rights of British nationals. The gray bars, finally, indicate that there are countries 
such as Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland (but also Germany) where the discrepancy 
between  citizens  and  voters  is  caused  by  the  exclusion  of  immigrants  who  do  not  have 
voting rights through the electoral law and who have a difficult access to nationality (and 
through that to voting rights). 
Figure 3: Citizenship and electorate in 18 OECD countries 
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In these cases we see very clearly the interaction at play between immigration flows and 
nationality  (or  naturalisation)  laws.  The  largest  discrepancies  between  citizenship  and 
electorate  exist  in  those  cases  in  which  large  rates  of  immigration  are  combined  with 
restrictive  nationality  laws.  As  seen  above,  this  is  the  factor  that  really  varies  across 
countries.  Whereas  electoral  laws  hardly  ever  allow  non-national  residents  to  vote, 
naturalisation may  or may not give  access to  voting rights. It is  therefore the  interaction 
between high rates of immigration and restrictive naturalisation laws that explain most of the 
cross-country variation of discrepancy between electorate and citizenship. The same cannot 
be said to the same extent for national expatriates. Here rates count, too, but as we have 
seen the variation in electoral laws (granting voting rights to emigrants) is small. 
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V.   Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the quality of representation does not only depend on the degree 
to which voters’ preferences are congruent with those of the representatives, but also on the 
degree  to  which  citizens  are  included  in  the  representation  circuit.  Based  on  a  broad 
definition of citizenship we have shown that citizen–representative congruence cannot be 
equated with, and operationalised through, voter–representative congruence. The more or 
less  large  discrepancy  between  citizenship  and  electorate  makes  this  one-to-one 
equivalence between citizenship and electorate problematic. The paper therefore questions 
the ―denominator‖, whether using electorates can replace citizenship. Our goal was to shift 
the  discussion  back  to  more  fundamental  problems  of  inclusion/exclusion,  to  which 
globalisation and the increasing geographical mobility of individuals gives new scope. 
Empirical results of the paper show that the main source of discrepancy between citizenship 
and  electorate  is  the  combination  of  high  rates  of  non-national  residents  (immigrants)  in 
countries in which naturalisation laws make it difficult to access nationality and thus voting 
rights. This large discrepancy is also not solved by electoral laws since these do usually not 
grant voting rights to non-nationals. Problems of representation are therefore strictly linked to 
conceptions of nationality – who is a member of the national community and who is not – 
and to conceptions of citizenship – who is a member of the political community and who is 
not. In principle, it would be possible to imagine changes in electoral laws granting voting 
rights  to  citizens  without  making  them  nationals.  This  would  make  it  possible  to  include 
citizens in the political community without including them in the national community. It is an 
instrument  that  would  solve  normative  conflicts  about  confusing  definitions  of  who  is  a 
national and who is not. It would also solve problems of temporality, since electoral laws 
could make voting rights for non-nationals dependent upon residency. Non-national citizens 
vote as long as they live and pay taxes in a country, and lose the right as soon as they leave 
it.  This  paper,  thus  also  points  to  normative  implications  for  future  research  and  policy 
making. 20 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
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